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For the past four decades, Republican control of the White House and 
Congress has not augured well for Indian country. Conservative 
administrations are unlikely to support trust land acquisitions, for example.
1
 
The current administration’s informal spokesmen talk openly of privatizing 
Indian trust and reservation lands, a twenty-first century form of 
termination.
2
 The Obama administration’s cooperation with Indian tribes in 
Indian child welfare litigation and trust land acquisition matters, to name 
two examples, is threatened, as are national monuments and the 
environment. There is much for tribal leaders and advocates to be 
concerned about from the federal government under the current 
administration. 
But Indian nations are timeless entities, and when the federal government 
is not receptive or is even hostile to tribal interests, modern Indian nations 
turn elsewhere for potential solutions. Right now, those potential solutions 
may lie with state legislatures and governments. This article is intended to 
provide a theoretical framework for tribal advocates seeking to approach 
state and local governments to discuss cooperation with Indian nations, 
with a special emphasis on Indian child welfare. While the federal 
government has a special trust relationship with Indians and Indian nations, 
Indian people are also citizens and residents of the states in which they live. 
Thus, states have obligations to Indians as well. 
After all, the Fourteenth Amendment obligates states and state actors to 
guarantee the equal protection of the law to similarly situated persons.
3
 But 
that guarantee too often stops at reservation borders because of deeply 
                                                                                                                 
  Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous Law and Policy Center, Michigan 
State University College of Law. Thanks to Kate Fort and Wenona Singel.  
 1. Land Acquisition Policy: Lookback and Update 7, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, W. 
REG’L OFFICE (Nov. 2016), https://nau.edu/uploadedFiles/Offices_and_Committees/Folder_ 
Templates/_Forms/Webb%20NAU%20-%20Land%20Acquisition%20Policy%20-%20Novem 
ber%202016.pdf (asserting that under the second Bush administration, there was “a de facto 
moratorium for almost five years” barring trust land acquisitions). 
 2. See generally Matthew Fletcher, A Look at the Next 4 Years in Indian Affairs, 
LAW360.COM (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/882778. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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misunderstood principles of federal Indian law, such as the notion that 
states have no responsibility to American Indians due to the federal 
government’s trust responsibility to Indians and tribes. Worse, even where 
states take action to guarantee equal protection to reservation residents, they 




This article posits the fairly controversial and novel position that states 
have obligations to guarantee equal protection to all citizens, including 
American Indians (and non-Indians) residing in Indian country. In other 
words, states have an affirmative obligation to ensure that reservation 
residents, Indian and non-Indian, receive the same services from states that 
off-reservation residents receive.  
States and local governments typically point to the special status of 
Indian tribes, tribal members, and even nonmember reservation residents as 
justification for differential treatment. Felix Cohen once brought suit to 
remedy inaction by Arizona and New Mexico officials, who refused to 
provide services to Havasupai Indians, denying them the equal protection of 
the law and leading to eighty-two deaths, on the grounds that Indians were 
the federal government’s sole responsibility.
5
 Modern examples abound. 
The Village of Hobart attempted to impose a restrictive covenant on lands 
within its jurisdiction in an attempt to prevent the Oneida Indian Tribe of 
Wisconsin from acquiring trust lands, claiming an injury to the village tax 
base should Indians acquire the lands.
6
 That same village also 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Cf. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American 
Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333, 346-47 (2004) (“The tribal governance power and 
immunity from some state laws (e.g., some taxes) results in the American Indians being 
charged with unjustifiably demanding ‘special rights.’ However, in the historical law dialog 
involving American Indians this term has legal content arising from the unique political 
relationship with the national government. Despite the terms in treaties that bind the United 
States to tribes in critical matters like land, water, and natural resources, unhappy non-
Indians demand that tribal rights be terminated to theoretically equalize everyone.”); Jo 
Carrillo, Identity as Idiom: Mashpee Reconsidered, 28 IND. L. REV. 511, 512-13 (1995) 
(describing anti-Indian groups that organize under the theory that Indian rights are invalid 
“special rights” that should be eliminated). 
 5. Karen M. Tani, States’ Rights, Welfare Rights, and the “Indian Problem”: 
Negotiating Citizenship and Sovereignty, 1935-1954, 33 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 3-4 (2015); 
see also Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in 
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 351 & n. 20 (1953) (describing the Mapatis v. Ewing 
(D.D.C. 1948) suit and how it was withdrawn when Arizona agreed to provide services). 
 6. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Baylake Bank v. TCGC & Village of Hobart — Covenant 
Against Tribal Ownership of Land, TURTLE TALK (Oct. 6, 2008), https://turtletalk. 
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unsuccessfully demanded that reservation Indians pay taxes in order to 
receive services from the county.
7
 The County of Manistee’s sheriff’s office 
cancelled a cross-deputization agreement with the Little River Band of 
Ottawa Indians in Michigan.
8
 In Fremont County, Wyoming, police refused 
to respond to calls for assistance by Wind River Indian Reservation police 
involving non-Indian suspects, claiming lack of jurisdiction.
9
 Elsewhere, 
Indian country communities routinely complain that state and local 
governments collect taxes on reservation activities without sharing revenues 
with tribal governments or providing equivalent services to reservation 
residents.
10
 Even tribal advocates often privately agree that such disparate 
treatment is just a consequence of the preservation of tribal sovereignty. But 
while these circumstances are common in Indian country, they should be 
considered Fourteenth Amendment violations. 
Additionally, state and local governments that take seriously their 
obligations to American Indians, are challenged and even attacked for 
doing too much for Indian people, creating “special rights” for Indians. The 
State of Minnesota, which enacted a statute implementing and 
domesticating the federal Indian Child Welfare Act,
11
 faces a federal 
constitutional challenge.
12
 The State of Washington, which entered into tax 
agreements with various tribes, narrowly prevailed against a state 
constitutional challenge.
13
 These “special rights” arguments are the same 
arguments the Supreme Court has robustly rejected in the treaty rights 
                                                                                                                 
wordpress.com/2008/10/06/baylake-bank-v-tcgc-village-of-hobart-covenant-against-tribal-
owner ship-of-land/.  
 7. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis. v. Village of Hobart, 732 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 8. Glenn Zaring, Cross-deputization Concerns in Manistee, LUDINGTON DAILY NEWS 
(Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.shorelinemedia.net/ludington_daily_news/archives/cross-deputi 
zation-concerns-in-manistee/article_3d3e5391-e421-52a0-ab32-3a5c197ef699.html.  
 9. Tristan Ahtone, A Broken System: Why Law and Order Is Faltering on the Rez, AL 
JAZEERA (Dec. 19, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/19/commission-
federalgovtisreasonforlittlejusticeinindiancountry.html.  
 10. Kelly S. Croman & Jonathan B. Taylor, Why Beggar Thy Indian Neighbor? The 
Case for Tribal Primacy in Taxation in Indian Country, JOINT OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON 
NATIVE AFFS. (May 4, 2016), http://nni.arizona.edu/application/files/8914/6254/9090/2016_ 
Croman_why_beggar_thy_Indian_neighbor.pdf.  
 11. Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), MINN. STAT. §§ 260.751 to 
260.835 (1985). 
 12. Doe v. Piper, No. 15-cv-02639, 2017 WL 3381820, at *1 (D. Minn., Aug. 4, 2017) 
(dismissing claim for mootness, but asserting there were “interesting and unclear questions 
of constitutional law”). 
 13. Auto. United Trades Org. v. State, 357 P.3d 615 (Wash. 2015). 
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 but they recur again and again. As we will see, these so-called 
“special rights” are not only allowable under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
states are required to guarantee them in order to ensure all state citizens are 
equally protected by the law. 
Part I of this article surveys the legal history of American Indian 
citizenship. American Indians began as noncitizens of the United States, 
excluded by the Constitution from citizenship as “Indians not taxed.”  
Part II details the principal argument of this article, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment further requires states to guarantee equal protection to persons 
both on—and off—reservation, Indians and non-Indians alike. American 
Indians, as the Supreme Court recognizes, are American citizens. As 
citizens, they are entitled to the same protections of law offered by states to 
off-reservation citizens. States and state actors that decline to guarantee that 
protection are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
There are two ways that adopting this theory would have an immediate 
impact on Indian country. First, states that have enacted statutes to 
implement the federal trust obligations to Indian education and child 
welfare would be fully authorized to do so under the Constitution. Second, 
states and localities that enter into intergovernmental cooperative 
agreements with Indian tribes would no longer be concerned with claims 
that those agreements are void without congressional approval. Instead, this 
article argues that states and localities are obligated to do so in order to 
guarantee equal protection to similarly situated citizens on and off 
reservation.  
I. From Deadly Enemies to Citizens: A Brief Legal History 
of American Indian Citizenship 
Before Congress extended citizenship to all American Indians by statute 
in 1924, and for decades later in some jurisdictions, American Indian 
citizenship and accompanying voting rights usually were governed by a 
hodgepodge of common law doctrines. States assessed whether potential 
                                                                                                                 
 14. E.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 
U.S. 658, 673 at n.20 (1979) (“The Washington Supreme Court held that the treaties would 
violate equal protection principles if they provided fishing rights to Indians that were not 
also available to non-Indians. The simplest answer to this argument is that this Court has 
already held that these treaties confer enforceable special benefits on signatory Indian 
tribes . . . and has repeatedly held that the peculiar semi-sovereign and constitutionally 
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment on their behalf when rationally related 
to the Government’s ‘unique obligation toward the Indians.’”) (citations omitted). 
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Indian citizens and voters were civilized, loyal, and competent using a 
variety of factors. Indians claiming citizenship might have to show they 
abandoned tribal relations, or abandoned treaty rights claims, or prove 
loyalty to a given state or to the United States. Indians might have to show 
they were competent under state law. Indians who were still considered 
under the guardianship of the federal government might be barred. Even 
after 1924, some states continued to assess whether Indians could vote in 
state elections under these rubrics. This practice continued as late as 1962. 
A. “Indians Not Taxed” and the Constitution 
As this subpart will show, the broad duty of protection to American 
Indians and Indian tribes assumed by the federal government initially did 
not extend to state governments. The duty of protection arose from the 
treaty-based relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes. 
In addition, the Constitution reflected the federal government’s plenary and 
exclusive authority. And Congress vigorously asserted its Indian affairs 
powers derived from the Indian Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, the 
Supremacy Clause, and other constitutional provisions. States, which as 
colonies and then under the Articles of Confederation, were left out of the 
matrix with the ratification of the Constitution. 
It is well established that the Constitution vested the federal government 
with plenary and exclusive authority over Indian affairs.
15
 The stark failures 
of the Articles of Confederation laid the groundwork for federal supremacy 
in this area, as Madison detailed in Federalist No. 42.
16
 The Indian 
Commerce Clause broadly authorized Congress to take the lead on 
legislative authority over all aspects of federal, state, and tribal affairs.
17
 
The Treaty Power, and the Indian treaties that arose from the invocation of 
                                                                                                                 
 15. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants 
Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have 
consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”) (quoting Washington v. Confederated 
Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 
U.S. 99, 103 (1993)). 
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (“The regulation of commerce with the 
Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of 
Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there 
restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the 
legislative right of any State within its own limits.”). 
 17. Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central 
function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to 
legislate in the field of Indian affairs . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
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this power, further vested powers in the United States, as well as cemented 
tribal sovereignty in the new American constitutional system.
18
 Other 
constitutional provisions—the Supremacy Clause, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and the Property and Territory Clause—rounded out federal 
authority.
19
 In the fabled Marshall Trilogy, the Supreme Court confirmed 
the federal government’s plenary and exclusive powers.
20
 The Court has 
repeatedly reaffirmed federal plenary power since those foundational 
cases.
21
 At times, the Court has even stated that federal power over Indian 




The Marshall Trilogy was the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
substance of what is now known as the federal trust relationship. In 
Worcester v. Georgia,
23
 the Court held that the United States had 
undertaken a duty of protection through the treaty making process, and was 
enabled to so do by the Constitution.
24
 The duty of protection derives from 
Indian tribes agreeing to come under the authority of the superior sovereign, 
                                                                                                                 
 18. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“The treaty power does not 
literally authorize Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing the 
President, not Congress, ‘to make Treaties.’ . . . But, as Justice Holmes pointed out, treaties 
made pursuant to that power can authorize Congress to deal with “matters” with which 
otherwise ‘Congress could not deal.’ Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 . . . (1920) . . . . 
And for much of the Nation’s history, treaties, and legislation made pursuant to those 
treaties, governed relations between the Federal Government and the Indian tribes.”). 
 19. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and 
Limitations, 132 U. PENN. L. REV. 195, 199 (1984). 
 20. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See generally 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the 
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 30-
42 (2002). 
 21. CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 1.4 
(May 2016 update) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK]. 
 22. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“Congress’ legislative authority 
would rest in part, not upon ‘affirmative grants of the Constitution,’ but upon the 
Constitution's adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal 
Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants of 
nationality.’”) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-322 
(1936)). 
 23. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. 
 24. Id. at 556. 
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 As the Worcester Court made clear, the duty of 
protection lets alone internal tribal affairs as tribes delegate much of the 
external authority to the federal government.
26
 
Importantly, the federal government pursued a robust form of what 
Charles Wilkinson would later term “measured separatism,”
27
 which 
loosely means keeping Indian tribes apart physically and legally from the 
rest of America. This period was a robust form of measured separatism 
because Congress, from its first legislative foray, barred Americans from 
entering Indian country without federal authorization.
28
 Some states, most 
notably Georgia, sought to take control of Indian reservation lands and 
resources.
29
 The federal government largely opposed state interventions in 
Indian country in order to secure federal control over Indian lands and 
resources, but also to forestall conflicts between Indians and American 
citizens.
30
 Still, throughout the nineteenth century, state efforts to assert 
control over Indian country, ostensibly barred by the Supremacy Clause, 




                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. at 555 (“This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection 
of one more powerful: not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and 
submitting as subjects to the laws of a master.”). 
 26. Id. at 556-57 (“From the commencement of our government, congress has passed 
acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect 
their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All 
these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several 
Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which 
their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which 
is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.”). 
 27. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE 
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14 (1987). 
 28. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 
137, 137 (1790) (“[N]o person shall be permitted to carry on any trade or intercourse with 
the Indian tribes, without a license for that purpose under the hand and seal of the 
superintendent of the department, or of such other person as the President of the United 
States shall appoint for that purpose . . . .”). 
 29. Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 
STAN L. REV. 500, 503 (1969). 
 30. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), excerpted in 
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 99-100 (7th ed. 
2017). 
 31. Deborah A. Rosen, Colonization Through Law: The Judicial Defense of State Indian 
Legislation, 1790-1880, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 26, 54 (2004) (“The [federal government’s] 
expectation and the plan that, wherever Indians lived in land coveted by whites, the Indians 
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What was then clear was that Indians were not Americans. Critical to the 
framing was exclusion of Indian people from the constitutional polity 
through the “Indians Not Taxed” Clause,
32
 which was included in the 
apportionment portion of the Constitution. Indians were not “free Persons,” 
nor were they slaves; that is, “all other Persons.” Indians born within the 
United States were not automatically American citizens, they were 
foreigners. In fact, as the first congressional definition of “Indian country” 
made clear, most Indian tribes and Indians were located outside American 
borders.
33
 Their nations were Indian tribes, with which the United States 
had a special relationship, a treaty relationship.
34
 Presumably, however, 
Indians could become American citizens by an act of Congress and, 
possibly, transform into what one could call “Indians Taxed.” Chief Justice 
Taney’s notorious Dred Scott opinion parsed out this analysis, 
contradistinguishing the hated and denigrated Indians from the even more 
hated and denigrated black slaves.
35
 There, the Supreme Court contrasted 
American Indians with African-Americans, concluding that Indians could 
theoretically obtain citizenship and voting rights through an act of 
Congress,
36
 but that African-Americans could not.
37
 Of course, Chief 
                                                                                                                 
would either move out of the way or assimilate into American culture and society. By 
successfully asserting their authority to regulate Indians in a range of between 1790 and 
1880, the states furthered that plan. They pressured Indians to leave their lands, and they 
increasingly exerted various degrees of rule over the Indians in order to further the 
colonization.”). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, ¶ 3 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free 
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not 
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”). 
 33. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (“That all that part of the United 
States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana or the 
territory of Arkansas, and also that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river not 
within any state, to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this 
act, be taken and be deemed to be the Indian country.”). 
 34. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN 
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN 
INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY (1994). 
 35. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally Frederick E. Hoxie, 
What Was Taney Thinking? American Indian Citizenship in the Era of Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 329 (2007). 
 36. Scott, 60 U.S. at 420. 
 37. Id. at 417 (“And this power granted to Congress to establish an uniform rule of 
naturalization is, by the well understood meaning of the word, confined to persons born in a 
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Justice Taney stated it was not advisable in his opinion to grant American 




A few states granted citizenship to certain Indians under state law, 
creating a distinction between federal and state citizenship for American 
Indians.
39
 These states usually required Indian people seeking state 
citizenship to prove that they were “civilized,” or had “abandoned” their 
tribal relations by declaring loyalty to the state or the United States, 
relinquishing their treaty rights, paying state taxes, adopting the habits and 
customs of white men, or some combination of all of these factors.
40
 For 
example, under Minnesota’s Constitution, Indians could become citizens 
entitled to vote in state elections if they adopted the “language, customs, 
and habits of civilization in order to vote.”
41
 Citing Dred Scott, the 
                                                                                                                 
foreign country, under a foreign Government. It is not a power to raise to the rank of a 
citizen anyone born in the United States who, from birth or parentage, by the laws of the 
country, belongs to an inferior and subordinate class.”). 
 38. Id. at 420 (“Congress might, as we before said, have authorized the naturalization of 
Indians because they were aliens and foreigners. But, in their then untutored and savage 
state, no one would have thought of admitting them as citizens in a civilized community. 
And, moreover, the atrocities they had but recently committed, when they were the allies of 
Great Britain in the Revolutionary war, were yet fresh in the recollection of the people of the 
United States, and they were even then guarding themselves against the threatened renewal 
of Indian hostilities. No one supposed then that any Indian would ask for, or was capable of 
enjoying, the privileges of an American citizen, and the word white was not used with any 
particular reference to them.”). 
 39. DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE LAW: SOVEREIGNTY, RACE, AND 
CITIZENSHIP, 1790-1880 (2007). 
 40. E.g., United States v. Elm, 25 F. Cas. 1006, 1007 (N.D. N.Y. 1877) (“If defendant’s 
tribe continued to maintain its tribal integrity, and he continued to recognize his tribal 
relations, his status as a citizen would not be affected by the fourteenth amendment; but such 
is not his case. His tribe has ceased to maintain its tribal integrity, and he has abandoned his 
tribal relations, as will hereafter appear . . . .”); Anderson v. Mathews, 163 P. 902, 906 (Cal. 
1917) (“Neither the members of the group nor, so far as known, the members of the tribe, 
were subject to, or owed allegiance to, any government, except that of the United States and 
the state of California, and, prior to 1848, that of Mexico.”); Bd. of Comm’rs of Miami 
County v. Godfrey, 60 N.E. 177, 180 (Ind. App. 1901) (“So long as he remained an Indian, 
he was under the control of the United States as an Indian. But he voluntarily does what the 
law says makes him a citizen. This change of his tribal condition into individual citizenship 
was primarily his own voluntary act. He cannot be both an Indian, properly so called, and a 
citizen.”). 
 41. Willard Hughes Rollings, Citizenship and Suffrage: The Native American Struggle 
for Civil Rights in the West, 1830-1965, 5 NEV. L.J. 126, 135 (2004); see also In re Liquor 
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Minnesota Supreme Court in 1917 noted that Indians “still cling to some of 
the customs and habits of their race, and are governed in their relation with 
each other by their peculiar tribal rules and practices, subject, in a certain 
sense, to the advice and supervision of the federal authorities.”
42
 Acting 
Indian, living in Indian country, and federal superintendency were factors 
that barred citizenship under Minnesota law.
43
 These notions would merge 
with the federal interpretation of the “Indians Not Taxed” Clause, and 
would also permeate Indian law and policy throughout the rest of the 
nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century.  
B. The Fourteenth Amendment and the “Deadliest Enemies”  
After the Civil War, the United States adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment granting citizenship to all persons born within the United 
States. But now, many, if not most, Indian tribes and American Indians 
were located within the borders of the United States. Once again, however, 
the government excluded “Indians not taxed.”
44
 In Elk v. Wilkins,
45
 the 
Court held that American Indians born in Indian country may not acquire 
citizenship upon their birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. American 
Indians could only acquire citizenship through an act of Congress. The 
distinction between federal and state citizenship, supposedly eliminated for 
all Americans after the Reconstruction Amendments, remained in place for 
American Indians.  
In 1870, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary issued a report that 
concluded the Fourteenth Amendment did not affect the legal status of 
American Indians.
46
 In the opinion of the report authors, the status of 
American Indians remained unchanged from the founding of the Republic 
                                                                                                                 
Election in Beltrami County, 163 N.W. 988, 989 (Minn. 1917) (“2. Persons of mixed white 
and Indian blood, who have adopted the customs and habits of civilization. 3. Persons of 
Indian blood . . . who have adopted the language, customs and habits of civilization, after an 
examination before any district court of the state, in such manner as may be provided by law, 
and shall have been pronounced by said court capable of enjoying the rights of citizenship 
within the state.’”). 
 42. Id. at 989. 
 43. Rollings, supra note 41, at 135. 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each state, excluding Indians not taxed.”). 
 45. 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
 46. S. REP. NO. 41-268 (1870). 
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through the Reconstruction period.
47
 At that time, it appears the dominant 
legal theory was that the United States had no authority to interfere with the 
internal relations of Indian tribes. The report concluded that because of the 
treaty relationship between tribes and the federal government, “Congress 
has never regarded the Indian tribes as subject to the municipal jurisdiction 
of the United States.”
48
 The report also assumed, in a statement that 
incorrectly ignores that treaty rights are vested property interests protected 
under the Fifth Amendment, that American citizenship would deprive 
Indians of their treaty rights.
49
 The report even asserted that if Congress 
tried to assert powers over internal tribal governance, those laws would be 
declared “unconstitutional and void.”
50
 In short, as the Judiciary Committee 
concluded, “The Indians were excluded because they were not citizens.”
51
 
The Supreme Court largely held fast to that theory of limited federal 
jurisdiction over the internal affairs of Indian tribes in Ex parte Crow 
Dog,
52
 holding that then-current federal statutes and treaties did not provide 
for federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian-on-Indian crimes in Indian 
country.
53
 However, the Court did conclude that Congress had authority to 
assert jurisdiction over internal tribal affairs, so long as there existed “a 
clear expression of the intention of Congress” to do so.
54
 Congress 
exploited that opening in enacting the Major Crimes Act in 1885.
55
 The 
Supreme Court confirmed the Major Crimes Act as a valid exercise of the 
federal government’s duty of protection in United States v. Kagama.
56
 
Importantly, while Congress moved toward breaking down the barriers 
between the United States and the internal affairs of Indian tribes, the 
Supreme Court preserved the wall between Indian tribes and state authority. 
The Court described the federal government’s authority as critical to 
protecting Indians from their “deadliest enemies,” states and their citizens: 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 1. 
 48. Id. at 9. 
 49. Id. at 1. 
 50. Id. at 9. 
 51. Id. at 10. 
 52. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 53. Id. at 572. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1153). 
 56. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
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“Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are 
found are often their deadliest enemies.”
57
  
As the power of Congress expanded in the 1880s, trending toward true 
plenary power, effective state power declined.
58
 It was during this period 
that the federal government oversaw or acquiesced to the monumental 
raiding of American Indian tribal resources—lands, timber, food sources, 
oil, gas, minerals, coal, gold, and so on—by private and occasionally public 
interests. American history usually celebrates this history as the closing of 
the frontier, but American Indians see this period very differently. 
The latter half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, 
loosely speaking, were the height of the assimilation movement of 
American law and policy.
59
 The United States undertook a program of 
mandatory education of American Indian students, forcing Indian children 
to move to boarding schools operated by federal officials or religious 
institutions.
60
 These boarding schools commonly acted to undermine tribal 
cultures by banning utterances of Indigenous languages and cultural 
practices, and harshly punishing even mild infractions. Coupled with the 
severe living conditions, which led to an untold number of deaths of Indian 
children around the United States,
61
 the schools often prevented Indian 




By the turn of the twentieth century, nearly all Indian tribes and 
American Indians were located inside the borders of the United States, 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 383-84. 
 58. Rosen, supra note 31, at 54 (“After about 1880, the federal government began 
taking a more active role in extending direct rule over Indians, no longer leaving that effort 
primarily to the states. Post-1880 federal policies aimed at breaking up the tribes absorbing 
individual Indians into American society.”). 
 59. The next Part details other aspects of assimilation, which involved the breakdown of 
the legal separation of Indians and Indian tribes from American citizens and states. 
 60. See generally DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN 
INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875-1928 (1995); BRENDA J. CHILD, 
BOARDING SCHOOL SEASONS: AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES, 1900-1940 (1998). 
 61. ADAMS, supra note 60, at 124-35; CHILD, supra note 60, at 55-58.  
 62. E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Implications for 
American Indian and Alaska Native Children, Families, and Communities, in AMERICAN 
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN AND MENTAL HEALTH 269, 275-77 (Michelle C. 
Sarche et al. eds., 2011) (describing the story of Bob Kewaygoshkum, former chair of the 
Grand Traverse Band, who was taken to an Indian boarding school in third grade and never 
saw his family again). 
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often on reservations. In scattered pieces of legislation, most notably the 
1887 General Allotment Act, Congress did extend citizenship to Indians 
that became “civilized” or abandoned tribal relations.
63
 By 1924, 
approximately half of American Indians had acquired citizenship through 
the allotment process or by another statute.
64
 After thousands of non-citizen 
Indians fought and died in World War I, Congress broadly extended federal 
citizenship to all American Indians born in the United States.
65
 It would 
take several more decades, but eventually all state governments recognized 
that American Indians were state citizens, too, eliminating the distinction 
between federal and state citizenship. 
American Indian citizenship under state law after 1924 was, perhaps, 
more complicated than under federal law. For many courts, Indian 
citizenship meant the extension of state criminal and regulatory jurisdiction 
over Indian off-reservation activities.
66
 In People v. Chosa,
67
 for example, 
decided six years after the citizenship act, the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that Indians who had become citizens had necessarily abandoned their 
off-reservation treaty rights and could be prosecuted under state law.
68
 
Forty years later, the Michigan Supreme Court would reverse Chosa to hold 
that Indian people retained treaty rights absent congressional abrogation.
69
 
Other state courts, however, would hold that the United States retained 
its “guardianship” over American Indian trust and reservation property.
70
 
The Supreme Court of Idaho, for example, rejected a Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutional challenge to a ban on liquor sales to Indians, 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 388, 390. 
 64. Rollings, supra note 41, at 134. 
 65. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 232, 43 Stat. 253, (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1401 (2012)). see also GRANTING CITIZENSHIP TO CERTAIN INDIANS, S. REP. NO. 66-
122, at 1 (1919) (noting 10,000 of 33,000 eligible Indians served in the armed forces during 
World War I).  
 66. E.g., State v. Big Sheep, 243 P. 1067 (Mont. 1926) (criminal jurisdiction); Red 
Hawk v. Joines, 278 P. 572 (Or. 1929) (action in replevin). 
 67. 233 N.W. 205 (Mich. 1930). 
 68. Id. at 207 (“When one becomes a citizen of the United States, he casts off both the 
rights and obligations of his former nationality and takes on those which pertain to other 
citizens of the country.”). 
 69. People v. Jondreau, 185 N.W.2d 375, 380 (Mich. 1971) (“[T]he foundations upon 
which Chosa rested have not stood the test of time.”). 
 70. E.g., In re Long’s Estate, 249 P.2d 103 (Okla. 1952) (barring probate of Indian trust 
property). 
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Some states, such as Michigan, authorized Indians to vote even before 
the Reconstruction but imposed vague obligations on Indians based on the 
“civilized” character of an Indian, whether the Indian was a ward of the 
federal government, or whether the Indian had renounced tribal status or 
treaty rights. By the early twentieth century, the remaining states that 
resisted allowing Indians to vote concluded that reservation Indians were 
not residents of the state in which the reservation was located.
72
 In 1962, 
New Mexico became the last state to recognize voting rights for American 
Indians when its supreme court held that Navajo Nation members are 
entitled to vote in state elections,
73
 rejecting the residence claim. Several 
counties in areas of high American Indian population and land ownership 
remain covered by the Voting Rights Act and subject to suit.
74
 
Ultimately, American Indians retained both the rights of American 
citizenship and the trust relationship with the United States.
75
 The duty of 
protection, first guaranteed by treaties and later formalized through federal 
acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty, survives into the modern era. 
American Indian law and policy is usually considered uniquely federal.
76
 
                                                                                                                 
 71. State v. Rovick, 277 P.2d 566, 569 (Idaho 1959) (“It is unnecessary to review the 
genetics or to indulge in a scientific analysis or discussion of anthropogeny to discover the 
reasons for the interdictions. Suffice to say that the historic background of laws prohibiting 
sale of intoxicants to Indians is well recognized and must now be considered as firmly 
established.”). 
 72. E.g., Allen v. Merrell, 305 P.2d 490 (Utah 1956) (rejecting Indian voting rights 
claim because he was not a resident of non-reservation lands), vacated, 353 U.S. 932 (1957); 
Porter v. Hall, 271 P. 411 (Ariz. 1928) (same). Contra Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 
(Ariz. 1948) (holding reservation Indians were residents). 
 73. Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387 (N.M. 1962). 
 74. See generally LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FIGHT FOR 
EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS (2010); Jeanette Wolfley, You Gotta Fight for the Right to Vote: 
Enfranchising Native American Voters, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265 (2015). 
 75. Tani, supra note 5, at 3 (“Under the terms of this arrangement, reservation Indians 
were entitled to the benefits of state citizenship but remained outside the state's jurisdiction 
in other regards, thereby retaining a key marker of sovereignty.”). 
 76. See generally Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE 
L.J. 1012, 1023-24 (2015) (“Received wisdom in both doctrine and scholarship has long 
held that the federal government enjoys exclusive power over Indian affairs, displacing state 
authority. Though the argument has a textual hook in the Indian Commerce Clause, this 
conventional wisdom – which I will call the nationalist account – ultimately rests on 
precedent and practice.”) (footnote omitted). 
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The United States accepted from its inception a duty of protection to 
American Indians and Indian tribes, a duty now referred to in law and 
politics as the trust relationship.
77
 Throughout much of American history, 
the federal government jealously guarded its exclusive power to deal with 
Indian tribes from states and foreign nations.
78
 The Supreme Court, early 
on, even held that state law has “no force” in Indian country.
79
  
About 150 years later, though, the Supreme Court referred to that early 
formulation of state and tribal relations derisively as a “platonic notion” 
that no longer controlled its analysis.
80
 Instead, tribal sovereignty formed a 
“backdrop” in determining state powers in Indian country and over 
American Indians.
81
 The Court bluntly stated, “Indians today are American 
citizens. They have the right to vote, to use state courts, and they receive 
some state services.”
82
 From that moment, if not before, the Court’s 
understanding of state powers in relation to Indian country, Indian tribes, 
and reservation activities changed, allowing greater state interventions in 
Indian law and policy. This shift is often lamented as an unjustified move 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556 (1832) (“This treaty, thus explicitly 
recognizing the national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self government; thus 
guarantying their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of course pledging the faith of 
the United States for that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is now in full force.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 78. See generally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1790-1834 (1962) (detailing the early 
decades of federal Indian law and policy). 
 79. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561 (“The Cherokee Nation, then, is a distinct community 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with 
the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of 
Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this Nation, is, by our 
Constitution and laws, vested in the Government of the United States.”) (emphasis added). 
 80. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“The modern 
cases thus tend to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look 
instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 81. Id. (“The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a 
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against 
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always be 
remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and 
that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 82. Id. at 172-73 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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from foundational principles of federal Indian law.
83
 Commentators, 
including myself, argue that states should have less authority over Indian 
country, reasoning that Indian tribal governance is undercut by states and 
their political subdivisions in a variety of ways. These critiques are not 
necessarily wrong, but neither is the Supreme Court. What changed from 
the “platonic” old days of total separation of American Indians from state 
law to the modern era is that by the end of 1924 all American Indians born 
in the United States were American citizens. 
II. The Broad State Duty to Protect American Indians 
and Reservation Residents 
American Indians are citizens. States and their subdivisions that invoke 
federal Indian law principles, such as jurisdictional limitations as 
justification for refusal to provide services or to negotiate with tribes, are in 
violation of their duties to their citizens under the Constitution. States and 
their subdivisions that invoke the problems of regulatory disruption as 
justification for their failures are also in violation of their duties. Comparing 
these reticent governments to governments that have reached agreement 
with Indian tribes is the proper baseline for determining whether state 
actors are treating similarly situated peoples the same. 
In the exercise of its trust relationship with Indians and Indian tribes, the 
United States has legislated extensively in a wide variety of governance 
areas, including without limitation health care, public safely, education, and 
Indian child welfare. Federal legislation in the areas of education and Indian 
child welfare goes a long way toward expressly authorizing similar state 
laws and initiatives toward meeting America’s trust duty to Indian children. 
State legislation, such as state Indian child welfare and public education 
enactments, are thus fully authorized by the Constitution. 
A. The Present-Day Understanding of Tribal-State Relations 
In general, Congress has the power to regulate state interactions with 
Indian tribes. Numerous federal laws authorize states to engage with tribes. 
Among the most prominent of such laws is the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act, which requires tribes to negotiate with states in order to conduct 
casino-style gaming.
84
 Additionally, state courts are obligated to grant full 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See generally DEWI IOAN BALL, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S SILENT REVOLUTION (2016). 
 84. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (2012). 
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faith and credit to tribal court personal protection orders.
85
 Most broadly, 
Congress obligated six states to assume criminal jurisdiction and a limited 
form of civil jurisdiction over Indian country within those states’ 
boundaries.
86
 In addition, the Indian Child Welfare Act authorizes states to 
enter into cooperative agreements with Indian tribes.
87
 
The Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection for all persons under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has an anomalous application in Indian 
country. First, the Constitution itself, by its own terms, is inapplicable to 
tribal governments.
88
 Congress responded in 1968 by enacting the Indian 
Civil Rights Act to guarantee equal protection to persons under tribal 
jurisdiction.
89
 Second, most federal Indian affairs legislation, almost by 
definition, includes a specter of racial classifications; Indian tribes are, after 
all, made up of Indian people.
90
 However, federal legislation enacted 
consistent with the federal government’s trust relationship with Indians and 
Indian tribes does not implicate the equal protection guarantee.
91
 
Federal classifications rationally related to the federal trust relationship 
with Indians and Indian tribes are valid under the Fifth Amendment’s equal 
protection component.
92
 For example, the Supreme Court has upheld Indian 
preference programs in employment at the Bureau of Indian Affairs under 
this theory.
93
 The Court has also upheld the principle of exclusive tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2012). 
 86. Act of Aug. 15, 1953 (Public Law 280), Pub. L. No. 83–280, § 2, 67 Stat. 588, 588-
89 (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) 
(2012) (parallel civil provision). 
 87. 25 U.S.C. § 1919(a) (2012) (“States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter into 
agreements with each other respecting care and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction 
over child custody proceedings, including agreements which may provide for orderly 
transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and agreements which provide for concurrent 
jurisdiction between States and Indian tribes.”). 
 88. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 89. Current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2012). 
 90. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552–53 (1974) (“Literally every piece of 
legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing 
with the BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or 
near reservations.”). 
 91. Morton, 417 U.S. 535. 
 92. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS § 9 & cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST., 
Tentative Draft, Apr. 22, 2015). 
 93. Morton, 417 U.S. 535. 
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jurisdiction over the domestic affairs of reservation Indians.
94
 The Court 
upheld the federalization of Indian country criminal jurisdiction, which 
subjects American Indians to different criminal laws than non-Indian co-
defendants committing the same crimes.
95
  
Federal legislation “singl[ing] out” American Indians to their benefit, or 
to their detriment,
96
 does not implicate the equal protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment in the same manner as legislation otherwise creating 
racial, ethnic, or ancestry-based classifications, which is subjected to strict 
scrutiny review by the judiciary. Instead, federal Indian affairs legislation is 
justified by the federal trust relationship with Indians and tribes. That 
relationship originally derived from the over 400 treaties legally and 
constitutionally that have been formed. The federal government’s 
acknowledgment of Indian tribes as entities capable of entering into treaties 
binding the United States separated Indians and tribes out as a unique 
political group—analogous in some ways to veterans and diplomats. Even 
tribes that do not have a treaty relationship may create a political 
relationship with the United States through the administrative 
acknowledgment process or through an act of Congress. This political 
relationship is one that Indian people negotiated for and often paid for with 
their lives and their resources. Federal Indian affairs legislation is based on 
that political relationship, not the racial background of Indian people. 
The Fourteenth Amendment applies to states in relation to American 
Indians just as it does to all other citizens. States may not discriminate 
against American Indians except when such discrimination is narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest.
97
 The only wrinkle is that states may 
also enact legislation that benefits American Indians where authorized to do 
so by federal statute or court order, or where the state legislation is enacted 
in accordance with the federal trust relationship with Indians and tribes. It is 
settled that state laws that implement the federal government’s obligations 
under the trust relationship do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
98
 For 
example, in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteen Judicial Dist. of Mont. in & for Rosebud Cty., 424 
U.S. 382 (1976). 
 95. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
 96. Morton, 417 U.S. at 552–53. 
 97. See generally Shira Kieval, Note, Discerning Discrimination in State Treatment of 
American Indians Going Beyond Reservation Boundaries, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2009). 
 98. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AMERICAN INDIANS § 9 & cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST., 
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 the Supreme Court held that the State’s regulations 
implementing its obligations under various American Indian treaties did not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
100
 
States are obligated to guarantee equal protection to all persons within 
their jurisdiction, and that guarantee extends to persons in Indian country 
who are, after all, citizens. First, though states do not have a direct trust 
relationship with Indians and Indian tribes like the federal government, 
states routinely legislate or take action consistent with the federal 
government’s trust obligations. In those instances, state action does not 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, states may discriminate against 
Indians or tribes by, for example, privileging one Indian tribe or another. 
States also may not take action that discriminates against Indians because of 
their racial or ancestral status. 
B. Ending the Refusal to Guarantee Services – Intergovernmental 
Agreements 
States have an affirmative obligation to ensure that reservation residents 
receive the protection of the law equal to off-reservation residents. 
Naturally, this will be a controversial claim. Indian tribes are jealous of 
their governance authority in Indian country, and only in careful, measured 
steps invite outside sovereigns into their homelands. States and local 
governments are too eager to stay out of Indian country, the government of 
which has traditionally been an unfunded and fraught with the potential for 
federal preemption. Still, state authority has penetrated Indian country in 
several dramatic ways. For example, nonmember activities are fully taxable 
by state and local governments, absent federal preemption-a rare 
occurrence.
101
 Public Law 280-type states already have significant civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over on-reservation activities. More importantly, 
American Indians and other reservation residents are American citizens, 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws. States, and even some tribes, 
may argue that the jurisdictional boundaries and tribal sovereignty excuse 
states from their equal protection obligations, but that excuse is unfounded.  
American Indians, even those who reside exclusively in Indian country, 
are American citizens.
102
 Reservation Indians, as the Supreme Court once 
                                                                                                                 
 99. 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
 100. Id. at 673 n.20. 
 101. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1999). 
 102. McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973). 
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 have numerous obligations to state governments. 
They pay state income taxes for off-reservation income.
104
 They pay state 
sales and use taxes for off-reservation purchases. They comply with motor 
vehicle registration requirements. They vote in state and local elections. 
They serve on state court juries. Nonmember reservation residents and 
entities also have duties to states. States may tax the on-reservation business 
activities of all nonmembers.
105
 States may regulate on-reservation 




Congress also has authorized much state action in Indian country. The 
most obvious and broad authorization is Public Law 280 and similar 
statutes.
107
 These statutes authorize states to assert criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian country, foreclosing federal criminal jurisdiction. These statutes 
also authorize state courts to assert jurisdiction over civil disputes that arise 
in Indian country. Because of historical land purchases and allotment by the 
federal government, much original reservation land is now owned or 
controlled by states, counties, or nonmember individuals and entities.
108
 
States have significant civil jurisdiction over those nonmember-owned 




Application of state law in Indian country is often haphazard. At times, 
the assertion of state power is onerous and even abusive. For example, 
                                                                                                                 
 103. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (“Essentially, absent governing 
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the 
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”); see also Dep’t 
of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 64 (1994) (“On-
reservation cigarette sales to persons other than reservation Indians, however, are 
legitimately subject to state taxation.”); Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 761 (1931) 
(“These Indians are not the usual reservation Indians.”). 
 104. E.g., Fond du Lac Band of Lac Superior Band of Chippewa Indians v. Frans, 649 
F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 105. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
 106. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (authorizing state to regulate 
on-reservation hunting and fishing); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 
(1983) (holding state regulation of on-reservation hunting and fishing on Indian lands was 
preempted). 
 107. Pub. L. No. 83–280 (Public Law 280), Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in 
relevant part as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)); see also 
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.5 (2016). 
 108. See generally Judith Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995). 
 109. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
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especially before the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978, 
state agencies routinely entered Indian country to remove Indian children 
from their reservation homes.
110
 During the allotment era, states and local 
governments vigorously asserted the power to tax Indian allotments, forcing 
Indians all too frequently to forfeit their lands to tax foreclosures, even 
where the state taxes were unlawful.
111
 At other times, states and local 
governments do not enforce criminal laws, even where authorized to do so, 
in Indian country.
112
 It is well established that many areas in Indian country 
are dramatically underserved. Larger Indian reservations suffer from a 
severe lack of law enforcement officers to patrol their vast territories. Many 
reservations have limited access to clean water, electricity, and other basic 
necessities of modern life. 
Many of the Indian country governance problems ravaging reservation 
residents could be solved quickly by acknowledging that states have an 
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that all American 
citizens, even those in Indian country, are entitled to the equal protection of 
the laws. It should be well established that states and localities may not 
simply deny services to reservation Indians because they have a more 
difficult time collecting taxes from those citizens.
113
  
That same principle should apply to intergovernmental relations. For 
example, the Sheriff of Manistee’s refusal to negotiate in good faith a 
public safety agreement with the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians could 
be an equal protection violation. Assuming the tribe also negotiated in good 
faith, the Sheriff’s refusal could mean that reservation residents, Indian and 
non-Indian, may be exposed to injury where no one responds to an 
emergency call. The violation comes in where reservation residents face 
greater exposure to injury resulting for poor emergency response than 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 107, § 8.8. 
 111. See generally id. § 3.6. 
 112. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1960 (2016) (“Even when capable of 
exercising jurisdiction, however, States have not devoted their limited criminal justice 
resources to crimes committed in Indian country.”). 
 113. E.g., Thompson v. State of New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 227 (N.D. N.Y. 1979) 
(“Generally, a policy decision affects the governmental operations of the municipality. 
Plaintiffs allege that they were denied police and fire protection because they are Indians, 
relatives of Indians or residents of the Oneida Indian Reservation. If true, this represents a 
deliberate policy intended to deny plaintiffs the services of the city and county because of 
plaintiffs' race or relationship to a race. Consequently, the Court believes that plaintiffs are 
entitled to present evidence to support their claim under Section 1983 against defendants 
County of Madison, and City of Oneida.”). 
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similarly situated persons near the reservation. In the case of Manistee 
County, Michigan, where there is a past history of campaigning against 
cooperation with the local tribe in several sheriff’s races, the obligation to 




In recent years, these high stakes lawsuits, occasionally initiated by 
tribes themselves, have reached comprehensive settlements. The Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe reached settlement with the State of Michigan and 
several local governments over a wide variety of issues ranging from 
criminal jurisdiction, taxation, environmental regulation, concluding an 
extremely high stakes lawsuit that could have eradicated portions of the 
tribe’s treaty rights.
115
 In short, these agreements are really quite viable. The 
only bar to agreements is state and local politics, and politics is no reason to 
deny and bar government services to reservation residents. 
C. Normalizing State Laws Implementing the Duty to Protect Indian 
Children – State Indian Child Welfare and Public Education Legislation 
State laws consistent with the federal duty to protect Indians and Indian 
tribes are constitutionally valid. Perhaps the most historically deep and 
critical trust obligation the United States recognizes is Indian child 
welfare.
116
 The long history of using Indian children as hostages in Indian 
wars, imposing forced education in boarding schools, and taking Indian 
children from their homes to be adopted into non-Indian families compelled 
the United States to enact the Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978.
117
 
The Indian Child Welfare Act is a federal mandate to state courts and 
agencies, partners in more than a century of interventions in Indian 
families. State courts must transfer Indian child welfare matters to tribal 
courts if the Indian child is domiciled in Indian country, and must transfer 
                                                                                                                 
 114. In the recent race for sheriff of Manistee County, for example, the Democratic party 
candidate promised to meet with the tribe, while the Republican party candidate made no 
such promise. Allison Scarbrough, Undersheriff vs. Lieutenant in Sheriff Race, MANISTEE 
COUNTY PRESS (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.manisteecountypress.com/2016/11/06/under 
sheriff-vs-lieutenant-in-sheriff-race. This alone might not constitute animus, but may be 
evidence of animus.  
 115. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 97, 
103-08 (2015). 
 116. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Indian Children and the 
Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship, 94 NEB. L. REV. 885 (2017). 
 117. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–608, § 2, 92 Stat. 3069, 3069 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012)).  
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all cases to tribal courts absent good cause to the contrary.
118
 The Act also 
requires state courts to guarantee due process to Indian parents, including 
the right to counsel.
119
 There are requirements for the burden of proof, 
placement preferences, active efforts, and other protections
120
 that have led 
the leading child welfare organizations to label the Act the “gold standard” 
in child welfare protection.
121
 
Eight states—five of which voted for Republicans in the last national 
election—have adopted legislation to implement the Indian Child Welfare 
Act.
122
 These statutes codify the Act as state law, filling in gaps in the 
federal legislation and providing clear guidance to state judges where the 
Act is ambiguous. These statutes occasionally provide even greater 
protections to families and children than offered under their federal 
counterpart. 
States enacting these laws are authorized to do so under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Historically, every state government participated in the 
removal of Indian children from their families and homes in and near Indian 
country. Congress attempted to turn over its trust obligation to educate 
Indian children to the states through the Johnson-O’Malley Act.
123
 The 
Executive branch introduced urban relocation and the Indian Adoption 
Project, which moved Indian people en masse out of Indian country to non-
Indian communities where they were strangers.
124
 During this period, 
Indian people living in their homelands had their lives disrupted as the 
states assumed jurisdiction over Indian people who were strangers to their 
new communities. State officials imposed their own education and child 
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Ensuring that history is not repeated cannot be considered the creation of 
“special rights.” If anything, state statutes implementing the Indian Child 
Welfare Act are long overdue in dealing with the aftermath of decades of 
state interventions into Indian homes and families, let alone those 




State governments and their non-Indian constituents, once considered the 
“deadliest enemies” of Indians and Indian tribes, are now critically 
important players in federal Indian law and policy. Most states, however, 
have yet to catch up to their obligations to their American Indian citizens. It 
is well established that cooperation between Indian tribes and state and 
local governments benefits reservation governance, specifically Indian 
children.
127
 By definition, negotiation and cooperation eliminate the 
inefficiency of jurisdictional conflict. The jurisdictional bars to providing 
government services to Indian people have no place in modern governance. 
Recent Republican administrations tend to undervalue tribal interests. As 
of this writing, little is known of the current administration given the 
continuous scandal-ridden confusion. However, for Indian country, it is 





 and perhaps even the undoing of the 
Indian Reorganization Act.
130
 Issues that tribal interests bring to the current 
                                                                                                                 
used approaches in child welfare stressing individualism, independence, confidentiality, and 
authority through formal education often are in direct conflict with traditional Native 
values.”). 
 126. E.g., Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749 (D.S.D. 2015) 
(detailing denials of Indian parents’ due process by state officials and state judges). 
 127. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AM. INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN 
EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE, ENDING VIOLENCE SO CHILDREN CAN THRIVE 63-64 (2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/defendingchildhood/pages/attachments/2015/03/2
3/ending_violence_so_children_can_thrive.pdf. 
 128. See generally Matthew Fletcher, New Divisions in Indian Country Over Energy 
Justice, LAW360.COM (May 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/nativeamerican/articles/ 
918997/new-divisions-in-indian-country-over-energy-justice. 
 129. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Political Lies and the Future of Voting Rights, TURTLE 
TALK (Jan. 27, 2017), https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2017/01/27/political-lies-and-the-
future-of-voting-rights/.  
 130. Hearing Memorandum from Majority Staff to All Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations Members, Concerning the Oversight Hearing Entitled “Examining Impacts of 
 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss2/3




administration are unlikely to move forward unless they are about resources 
extraction and voter suppression. 
It is time for tribal advocates to continue to develop tribal-state relations. 
In some states, like Michigan, there are numerous pathways to addressing 
jurisdictional issues over government services, for example. In other states, 
not so much. This article is designed to provide for tribal advocates a 
theoretical framework for developing tribal-state agreements, and even 
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